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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Melton appeals from the summary dismissal of his second successive 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Mellon was convicted of lewd conduct with a child in 2003 and his 
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 340-
41, 223 P.3d 281, 282-83 (2009). Melton filed his first petition for post-conviction 
relief, which was dismissed. ~ at 341, 223 P.3d at 283. He then filed a 
successive petition, which was also dismissed. ~ The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal of the successive petition because even though the district 
court erred by failing to rule on the motion for appointment of counsel the petition 
failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim. ~ at 345, 223 P.3d at 287. 
Seventeen months after the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal 
of Melton's successive petition Melton filed a second successive petition. (R., 
pp. 1-7.) In the second successive petition Melton alleged two counts of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the appeal of his successive petition. (R., pp. 
3-6.) The district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss and to deny appointment 
of counsel because the petition was frivolous, both on the merits and because it 
was untimely. (R., pp. 33-43.) Having received no response within 20 days, the 
district court dismissed the second successive petition. (R., pp. 44-45.) Melton 
filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 47-50.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Melton's statement of the issues on appeal can be found in the Appellant's 
brief at pages 10 through 14. They are not repeated here due to their length. 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Melton failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his second 
successive petition for post-conviction relief because it is untimely? 
2 
ARGUMENT 
Melton Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Untimely 
Second Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
"Error is never presumed on appeal and the burden of showing it is on the 
party alleging it." Stewart v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 
689 (2004) (quotations omitted); Farrell v. Board of Com'rs, Lemhi County, 138 
Idaho 378, 390, 64 P.3d 304, 316 (2002) (appellant carries burden of showing 
error on record and error never presumed); State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 
919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (appellant has burden of showing error in record). The 
district court determined that Melton's second successive petition, filed more than 
one year after the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the order of summary dismissal 
of the first successive petition, was barred by the applicable statute of limitation. 
(R., pp. 35-36 (a copy of the district court's notice of intent to dismiss is attached 
as an exhibit to this brief and incorporated by reference).) Neither below nor on 
appeal has Melton asserted any ground why the second successive petition 
should not be deemed barred by the statute of limitation. (See generally R., 
Appellant's brief.) Melton has therefore failed to show error in the dismissal of 
his second successive petition. 
3 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Melton's second successive petition. 
DATED this 14th day of March, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of March, 2012, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
RAYMOND JULIUS MELTON 
IDOC #72229 
ICC 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
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BY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DIST7ittii 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
RAYMOND J. MELTON, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) Case No, CV-2011-278 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
On May 24, 2011 the petitioner filed his third petition for post-conviction relief together 
with a motion for appointment of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the 
petition is untimely and that his motion for appointment of counsel should be denied. The Court, 
having reviewed the successive petition for post-conviction relief filed on May 24, 2011, and in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 19A906(b ), notifies petitioner that the petition, on its face, fails to 
meet the requirements of LC. Section 19-4901 et seq. as set forth in further detail below. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1 - NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 33 
( \ ) 
On September 12, 2003 the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Lewd 
Conduct with Child under Sixteen, LC. §18-1508. 
On December 16, 2003 a Judgment of Conviction was entered by the court and the 
petitioner was sentenced to life with 25 years determinate. The petitioner on December 22, 2003 
appealed bis conviction and sentence, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an 
unpublished opinion. State v. Melton, Docket No. 30348 (Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2004). 
On April 19, 2004 the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (Gooding 
County Case No. CV-2004-310). An evidentiary hearing was held and the petition was dismissed 
by the district court on January 13, -2005. On February 9, 2005 the petitioner appealed the 
dismissal of bis petition for post-conviction relief. The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme 
Court and the remittitur was issued on March 22, 2006. 
On May 1, 2006 the petitioner filed a second or successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. The petition claimed that his prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective at the prior 
evidentiary hearing on his original petition. The district court summarily dismissed the 
successive petition without appointing counsel for the petitioner on July 21, 2006. On August 28, 
2006 the petitioner appealed the dismissal of his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
On December 9, 2009 the Supreme Court issued its published opinion affirming the dismissal of 
the successive petition for post-conviction relief. Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 223 P.3d 281 
(2009). The remittitur was filed with the district court on.January 13, 2010. 
On May 20, 2011 the petitioner mailed to the clerk of the court a Verified Successive 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with Affidavits attached together with a Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel which were filed on May 24, 2011. This third or successive petition 
alleges that the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was ineffective in his representation of 
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the petitioner in the prior appeal of bis petitions post-conviction relief. The petitioner 
indicates in bis pending petition that be has filed a '"Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus" which may 
be dismissed because the SAPD did not raise any federal claims in his prior appellate 
proceedings in the state court. 
II. 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
In Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001) the court addressed the 
issue of appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings and stated as follows: 
As stated above, a needy applicant for post-conviction relief is 
entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the trial court determines 
that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous. Idaho Code§ 19-
852(b)(3) sets forth the standard for determining whether or not a 
post-conviction proceeding is frivolous. It is frivolous if it is "not 
a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would 
be willing to bring at bis own expense. 11 When applying that 
standard to pro se applications for appointment of counsel, the trial 
court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a 
pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. 
Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged 
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the 
pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential 
elements of a claim. 
It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the 
claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to give the 
trial court an adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel 
based upon the merits of the claims. If the court decides that the 
claims in the petition are frivolous, the court should provide 
sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable 
the petitioner to supplement the request with the necessary 
additional facts, if they exist. Although the petitioner is not 
entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record for 
possible nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a 
meaningful opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his 
request for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of his 
petition where, as here, he has alleged facts supporting some 
elements of a valid claim. 
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Also See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-793, 102 P .3d 1108, 1111-
1112 (2004). 
As noted above, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance from the 
SAPD as to his prior appeals of the dismissal of his prior petitions for post-conviction relief. His 
last appeal was finally decided and became final on January 13, 2010 when the remittltur was 
filed with the district court. The petitioner has waited approximately 1 year and 4 months before 
he filed his petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of the SAPD. The 
petition would appear to be frivolous because as an original or successive petition it would be 
untimely. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P .3d 870 (2007). The petition was not filed 
within one year of the finality of dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief nor 
was it filed within a reasonable time after the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of his 
second petition for post-conviction relief. Further, the court of appeals in Nguyen v. State, 126 
Idaho 494, 497-498, 887 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Ct. App. 1994) found that ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the appeal stage of a post-conviction application is not an appropriate ground for 
relief. 
Due to the untimeliness and the lack of merit to the petition, the court therefore 
determines that the petition is frivolous in that a reasonable attorney at this stage would not have 
:filed such a petition. Therefore, the request for appointed counsel is DENIED. 
m. 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, entirely distinct from the 
underlying criminal action. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001). If the petition 
fails to present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporfrng its allegations, and making 
4 - NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
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a prim.a facie case, i.e. establishing each essential element of the claim, then summary dismissal 
is appropriate. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794; 992 P.2d 789 (1999); Martinez v. State, 126 
Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). While the Court is required to accept 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations, it need not accept petitioner's bare or conclusory allegations. 
Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738 (1998); King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757 P.2d 705 
(Ct. App. 1988). The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions, Idaho Code § 19-4902, 
provides that a petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of appeal or from the 
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.'' A successive petition in 
a non-capital case must be filed within a reasonable time which is to be determined on a case by 
case basis .. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-905, 174 P.3d 870, 874-875 (2007). 
When presenting a successive petition for post-conviction relief, it is the burden of the 
petitioner to establish sufficient reason as to why the ground for relief was not asserted in his 
original petition; or was inadequately asserted in her original petition or that any waiver of an 
asserted claim was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived. LC. § 19-4908. Therefore 
the court should not consider the grounds set forth in a successive petition until the petitioner bas 
established a "sufficient reason" as to why it was not raised or was inadequately raised in the 
original petition. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 420 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. 
App. 2005) summarized the standard relative to a successive petition for post-conviction relief as 
follows: 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCP A) is designed 
to deal with collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions 
and sentences, not collateral attacks upon other post-conviction 
proceedings. Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 
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( Ct.App.1987). Ineffective assistance of counsel ir1 post-
conviction proceedings is not among the permissible grounds for 
filing another post-conviction relief application, Id. All grounds 
for relief available to an applicant under the lJPCP A must be 
raised in an applicant's original, supplemental, or amended 
application. LC. § 19-4908. The language of Section 19-4908 
prohibits successive applications in those cases where the applicant 
"knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" waived the grounds for 
relief sought in the successive application or offers no "sufficient 
reason II for omitting those grounds in the original application. See 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955,957 (1981). 
However, Section 19-4908 allows an applicant to raise a ground 
for relief, which was addressed in a former application, if he or she 
can demonstrate sufficient reason why that ground was 
inadequately raised or presented in the initial post-conviction 
action. See Hernandez v: State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 
793 (Ct.App.1999). A.ti allegation that a claim was not adequately 
presented in the first post-conviction action due to the ineffective 
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides 
sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately 
presented to be presented in a subsequent application for post-
conviction relief. Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 798, 992 P.2d at 793. 
Lastly, the "statutory scheme of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is designed 
to deal with challenges to allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks 
upon other post-conviction proceedings.'' Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 497-498, 887 P.2d 39, 
42-43 (Ct. App. 1994). 
IV. 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
This court pursuant to LR.E. Rule 201 hereby takes judicial notice of the Petition for 
Post- Conviction Relief, filed April 19, 2004 and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
filed January 13, 2005 in CV-2004-310; the Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed 
May 1, 2006 and Order on Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed July 21, 2006 in 
CV-2006-298. 
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v. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Successive Petition is Untimely. 
The SAPD represented the petitioner on the appeals of the dismissal of his two prior 
petitions for post-conviction relief. In the first appeal the SAPD was granted leave to withdraw 
by the Supreme Court on the basis that the appeal did not have merit and the appeal was 
thereafter dismissed by the Supreme Court on January 25, 2006. The petitioner then filed a 
successive petition on May 1, 2006, which was summarily dismissed without the court 
addressing the request for counsel. The petitioner filed another appeal and the SAPD was 
appointed. On appeal it was argued that the district court erred in failing to address the request 
for appointment of counsel before summarily dismissing the successive petition. The Court 
found that while the district court should have first addressed the motion for counsel, that the err 
was harmless because " ... even with every inference in his favor, Melton's successive petition for 
post-conviction relief did not raise the possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person 
with adequate means would have been willing to retain counsel to investigate." Melton v. State, 
148 Idaho at 343,223 P.3d at 285. 
The petitioner herein had notice on March 22, 2006 that his original petition was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court after the withdrawal of the SAPD when the petitioner failed to 
file a brief in support of his appeal. Within a couple of months of the dismissal of his original 
petition the petitioner pro se filed his second or successive petition for post-conviction relief on 
May 1, 2006. The petitioner had notice that the summary dismissal of his petition on state 
procedural grounds was affirmed by the Supreme Court and was final on January 13, 2010 when 
the remittitur was filed with the district court. The petitioner alleges that he has filed a federal 
7 - NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
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petition for writ of habeas corpus and based on the petitioners' allegations this federal petition is 
presumed to have been filed sometime after January 13, 201 0. 
In his third/successive petition the petitioner alleges that the S.LIJ>D was h1e:ffective in 
failing to raise on his appeals that his post-conviction attorney (which would only relate to his 
original petition because counsel was not appointed on his second petition) " ... neglected to 
submit a key piece of evidence [i.e. letters from the victim] that he was in possession of to the 
court for consideration at the evidentiary hearing ... " (Successive Petition, pg. 3-4). Secondly, the 
petitioner alleges that the SAPD was ineffective in failing to " ... federalize his claims ... " 
(Successive Petition, pg. 4-5). 
If one were to assume that the petitioner had a valid independent claim for post-
conviction relief as to the actions of the S.LIJ>D in the handling of the petitioners' appeals, to wait 
more than one year after his state court appeals were final is not reasonable under and set of 
circumstances. LC.§ 19-4902(a); Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904-905, 174 P.3d 870, 
874-875 (2007). 
Therefore the third successive petition must be denied as untimely. 
B. The Successive Petition is without merit. 
The petitioner in his original petition raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct relative to 
the testimony of the victim at the preliminary hearing and he further alleged that his post-
conviction attorney failed to produce the victim's letters and certain witnesses at his evidentiary 
hearing. The petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing and admitted to having had anal to 
genital contact with the victim his daughter. The SAPD was granted permission to withdraw 
from the appeal of the dismissal of the origh1al petition because it could not find any non-
frivolous claims to raise on appeal. The petitioner after the withdrawal of the S.LIJ>D was granted 
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additional time to file a brief in support of his appeal and when he failed to do so his appeal was 
dismissed. 
After the dismissal of his second/successive petition there was another appeal that was 
handled by the SAPD. The SAPD argued that the district court erred in failing to address the 
motion for appointment of counsel before summarily dismissing the second petition. The district 
court on July 21, 2006 entered its order summarily dismissing the successive petition finding that 
the petitioner had failed to raise a valid claim that would warrant an evidentiary hearing and the 
issues raised had previously been adjudicated and that his post-conviction counsel was deficient 
or that any alleged deficiency, if there were any would not have changed the outcome of bis 
original petition. The court in Melton v. State, supra., in affirming dismissal of the second 
petition held that the failure to address the motion for appointment of counsel did not prejudice 
the substantial rights of the petitioner because, 
If his counsel had produced letters and witnesses in the prior post-
conviction proceeding supporting Melton's claim that C.M. had been 
coerced and coached by the State, it would not have changed Melton's 
own testimony that: (1) C.M. only lied about throwing her on the bed, and 
(2) he had anal-to-genital contact with her. Therefore, Melton does not 
raise the possibility of a valid claim ... " Id 148 Idaho at 345, 223 P.3d at 
287. 
It is clear from the record that the petitioner has failed to establish a sufficient reason for 
a third/successive petition for post-conviction relief and that the petition is without merit as a 
matter of law. 
Lastly, the petitioner alleges that the SAPD was ineffective in failing to "federalize the 
claims" for the purpose of his federal writ of habeas corpus, however, the "statutory scheme of 
the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is designed to deal with challenges to allegedly 
improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon other post-conviction 
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proceedings." Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 497-498, 887 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Therefore, this claim is not a basis for relief in. the third petition and should be dismissed. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to I.C. Section 19-4906(b), petitioner is hereby notified that based upon the 
Successive Petition and the record presented to the Court, the Court provisionally intends to dismiss 
the Successive Petition for the reasons set forth above. Petitioner is hereby notified that he is 
entitled to reply to this notice of intent to dismiss within twenty (20) days following the date of 
service of this order. In the event that-petitioner shall fail to respond or shall fail to make timely or 
adequate response, the petition will be dismissed without further notice or hearing pursuant to I.C. 
Section 19-4906(b). The motion for appointment of counsel is denied subject to reconsideration 
upon receipt of petitioner's response to the notice of intent to dismiss. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this __fe_ day of Wu , 2011 
l O NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the i:_ daJi of ~ , 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF INTENT TO ISMISSwas mailed, postage paid, 
and/or hand-delivered to the follov.-ing persons: 
Raymond J. Melton 
IDOC # 72229 
LC.C. 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Calvin Campbell 
Gooding County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 86 
624 N. Main St 
Gooding, Idaho 83330 
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IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC-T-::;· ~T::z:::IW~-~U-T_Y_ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
RAYMOND J. MELTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF ID.A.HO, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2011-278 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
On May 24, 2011 the petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The court 
determined that the petition was failed to meet the requirements of LC. § 19-4901, et. seq. and 
the court entered its Notice of Intent to Dismiss in accordance with LC. § 19-4906(b) on June 6, 
2011. 
The court hereby determines that more than 20 days have expired since the service of the 
Notice of Intent to Dismiss and the petitioner has not filed any response to the court's Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss. The court having found that the petition for post-conviction relief is without 
merit as a matter of law and pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-4906(6 ), petitioner was notified 
i - ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
,, ·.-· .: ... ~".::.__,:_ ,.n.,'. 
